World Wars I and HI demonstrates that air power was once effective in a constabulary and small-war situation. That experience points out how air power, in the hands of creative strategists, can be shaped and applied to support a government's most trying political responsibilities.
Genesis of Air Control
The Before air control came onto the scene, the British had been using ground forces to control the empire for generations. Essentially, the British had developed two types of operations: the punitive expedition followed by withdrawing the troops to some centralized base, the so-called "burn and scuttle" technique, and an expedition followed by military occupation. There were many obvious difficulties with the army method of control. Paramount was the expense of mounting and maintaining a large expeditionary force.
Because of the cost, expeditions could be sent out only rarely and then only when the need for action had been demonstrated repeatedly.
The aim of those expeditions was to administer a major defeat to discourage further undesirable behavior by forcing guerrilla fighters or nomadic tribesmen to concentrate and face British regiments.
Usually, the British entered and partially destroyed villages to provoke a major battle with the insurgents. However, these campaigns in distant and often harsh areas were hard on British troops with numerous losses due to disease. And the desired political effect was often superficial and transitory. As soon as the punitive column withdrew, the chastised offenders would begin planning new activity against established authority.
There were other problems with the army method. If you do not produce the fine and the men, you must leave ali your villages and fields, taking all your property and animals with you, and keep right away until the Government gives you pernission to come back. The Government will do this as soon as you have complied with the terms, your villages an fields may be bombed or fired on at any time by day or night, and you are particularly warned not to touch any bombs that do not go off, as if you do so you will probably get killed. To disseminate this intelligence effectively required a wellorganized and efficient communications system. During the air control era, the British made good use of wireless telegraphy sets to keep intelligence and political officers in the field in constant touch with the air staff headquarters and higher-level political authorities.
to
One drawback of wireless communication, even in the 1920s and '30s, was the proble-n of shifting the responsibility for action from the man in the field to higher-level decision-mnakers at home. One of the doctrinal tenets of air control was that the authority to act must be delýgated to the on-the-scene commander. Perhaps the most important lesson we can extract from this phase of Royal Air Force history is that air power can be shaped in creative ways for effective political results.
The methods used by the British to achieve simple solutions were not all that simple, at least as the doctrine involved grew with experience. It took a very sophisticated combination of superb intelligence, communications, and psychological warfare coupled with a judicious application of firepower to achieve the desired outcome: pacification of a troubled colonial area with minimum violence, lasting results, and minimum cost. To design such a program required a flexibility of thinking that was most impressive.
-irnen emerging from World War I with their experience of fleets of aircraft being used for bombing and air-to-air nissions were able to nodify their concepts of air power to apply it to a totally new environment with a totally new mission. developing the doctrine and means for using air power in small wars.
Efforts to develop Air Force ability to participate in wars at the lower end of the conflict spectrum, from peacekeeping to supporting a threatened friend to actual intervention, could lead US decision makers to consider air power as a worthwhile policy option in the Third World.
It behooves us in the Air Force to consider seriously the capabilities and doctrine relative to small wars, which the Royal Air Force developed when air power was still very young, to see if we can do it as effectively as the British did so many years ago.
